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‘SCALING UP’ EDUCATIONAL CHANGE:  SOME MUSINGS ON MISRECOGNITION AND 
DOXIC CHALLENGES  
 
Pat Thomson 





Educational policy makers around the world are strongly committed to the notion of 
‘scaling up’. This can mean anything from encouraging more teachers to take up a 
pedagogical innovation all the way through to system-wide efforts to implement ‘what 
works’ across all schools. In this paper I use Bourdieu’s notions of misrecognition to consider 
the current orthodoxies of scaling up. I argue that the focus on ‘process’ and 
‘implementation problems’  (1) both obscures and legitimates the ways in which the field 
logics of practice actually work and (2) produces/reproduces the inequitable distribution of 
educational benefits (capitals and life opportunities). I suggest that the notion of 
misrecognition might provide a useful lens through which to examine reform initiatives and 
explanation of their success/failure.   
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‘SCALING UP’ EDUCATIONAL CHANGE:  SOME MUSINGS ON MISRECOGNITION AND 
DOXIC CHALLENGES  
 
 
One of the ideas that have had considerable traction in educational policy-making is that of 
‘scaling up’. This simply means that if it is possible to find out what it is that some students, 
teachers, leaders or schools do to become successful, then these ‘best practices’ can be 
spread this through the system. This change theory is also implicit in the idea of 
‘beacon/lighthouse schools’ and ‘evidence based practice’ which also hold it is possible to 
transfer what is done in one location and context to another. ‘Scaling up’ has been a 
particularly persuasive notion when it comes to thinking about how to change what schools 
serving the poorest populations might do. A variety of studies seek to elaborate and codify 
the pedagogical and leadership practices of ‘successful’ and ’turnaround’ schools in order 
that they might then be applied more widely (Chapman & Harris, 2004; Elmore, 2004; 
Fullan, 2009; Leithwood, Aitken, & Jantzi, 2006; Levin, 2008). The assumption underpinning 
this kind of ‘scaling up’ is that the education system as a whole will be more effective and 
equitable if failure, measured against standards and benchmarks, is reduced. 
 
‘Scaling up’ has proved difficult to achieve. The vast majority of reform programmes fail to 
achieve their goals (Datnow, Hubbard, & Mehan, 2002; Fink, 2000). There is therefore now 
a significant body of research and partnership activity between school authorities, school 
leaders and reform organisations which advocate for, monitors and theorises ‘scaling up’ 
and its relative successes and failures. There appears to be broad general agreements 
among these constituencies about the causes of reform failure and what is needed for 
‘success’. This paper examines these notions of scaling up and the ways in which it is (said to 
be) undermined and achieved. 
 
My aim is to test the explanatory power of Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition in the light 
of contemporary orthodoxies of educational reform. I introduce Bourdieu’s field theory and 
bring it to an analysis of ‘scaling up’. I examine the usual reasons given for the failure of 
rescaling up reforms, before providing two indicative examples of change leadership – the 
kind that are typically used to show what ought to be system–wide practice – to sketch 
what happens as they spread. I also consider what making changes in the field might 




The concept of scaling up is a relatively straightforward one. It simply means spreading a 
particular practice or idea so that it becomes much more common. The concept does not 
encompass what is to be spread, why and not always to what extent. The notion of scaling 
up is an ‘open signifier’ (Saussure, 1959), able to be populated with all manner of whats, 
whys, and how muchs. The focus in scaling up is most often on process, on the how. 
 
The idea of scaling up has currency in development literatures and practice where it refers 
inter alia to highly diverse interventions, ranging from health promotion and disease 
prevention to more ‘sustainable’ agricultural practices to Western educational approaches 
such as inclusive education (Knippenberg et al., 2005; e.g. Koenig, Leandre, & Farmer, 
2004; Lin, 2012). There has been a great deal of debate about the how of scaling up in the 
development field – this extends from critiques of the ‘trickle down’ approach to 
taxonomies of scaling up and debates about the locus of activities, tools and technologies 
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(e.g. Downing, Lamont, & Newby, 2010; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Schultz & Strauss, 2008; 
Uvin & Miller, 1996).  
 
 As noted, scaling up is also an idea popular in education. It is for example taken up in 
relation to changes in assessment practice (Leahy & Wiliam, 2011), the use of information 
and communication technologies (Blumenfield, Fishman, Krajcik, & Marx, 2000), social and 
emotional education (Elias, Zins, Graczyk, & Weissberg, 2003) and early literacy 
interventions (Landry, Swank, Smith, Assei, & Gunnewig, 2006). It is not my intention to 
provide a comprehensive review of all of these interventions and innovations. Rather, my 
interest in this paper is in the scaling up taken up in the overlapping school 
effectiveness/school improvement and school reform/ education change areas. I am 
particularly interested in how failure of large-scale educational reform is understood; I will 
therefore here briefly canvass the key common understandings about scaling up, its 
successes and failures.  
 
The SESI/reform/change field generally advocates a scaling up heuristic - set of components 
for any kind of activity (see figure 1). The heuristic has a strong how focus, with the what 
and why being available for local interpretation. Increasingly however, the ‘what’ equates to 
better performance on standardised measures and the why as international 
competitiveness/performance.  
 
(1) The innovation phase might entail either or both of research or school based 
piloting. The research might range from action research to design research to 
randomised controlled trials.  
(2) The capacity building phase focuses on systemic professional development, 
leadership enhancement, additional resourcing, the development of standards and 
measures and the provision of some incentives.  
(3) The implementation stage sees some reduction in resourcing, publication of best 
practices, local professional development, monitoring against the standards with 
disincentives for failure. 
(4) Sustainability relies on the transfer of responsibility and further reduced resourcing 
to the devolved unit, usually the school, with ongoing monitoring and a reward and 
punishment regime often instituted as a means of dealing with the apparently 
tardy.  
 
Figure 1: My interpretation - scaling up heuristic (see for example the materials on the 
National Centre for Scaling Up Effective Schools. Vanderbilt University  
www.scalingupcenter.org). Accessed April 24, 2013. 
 
There are of course significant variations to this heuristic with different consultants/ 
scholars offering differing emphases and different arguments as to the relative merits of 
each of the elements. The Rand Corporation stresses the importance of building capacity to 
implement and sustain the reforms, adjusting for local culture and policy, ensuring quality 
control, providing the necessary infrastructure, and fostering a sense of ownership. They 
stress that the scaling up process is iterative and complex, and requires cooperation among 
many actors who must ensure that the results align with goals (Glennan, Bodilly, Galegher, 
& Kerr, 2004). Levin (2008) emphasizes the importance of a focus on a few key student 
outcomes, capacity building, taking a positive approach and building political and public 
support. Others highlight the role of local leaders - using data to monitor and guide their 
activities (Boudett & Steele, 2007), following the characteristics of successful/effective 
leaders and schools (Fullan, 2011; Stoll & Fink, 1996), strategically coordinating local 
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leaders’ efforts (Leithwood, et al., 2006), and allowing school leaders to take up more 
systemic roles (Hopkins & Higham, 2007).  
 
There are also national policy differences and different approaches within countries 
depending on the initiative. Sometimes the first scaling up phase might be omitted 
altogether – as in the English free schools policy - and in many cases, innovations never 
make it to the stage where they might become sustainable. Anxious policy makers also 
create situations where scaling up is impossible because of the sheer volume and rapidity of 
innovations they initiate (Levin, 1998).  
 
However, despite local inflections used by policy-makers, the dominant notion of scaling up 
as it is generally used has little truck with context. When Sahlberg (2012) refers to GERM – 
the Global Education Reform Movement – or Thomson, Gunter and Blackmore (2013)  to 
the TLP – the Transnational Leadership Package – they are referring to practices which are 
assumed to be both transferable across national boundaries, and scaleable at any size – one 
school, a school district, or a national education system. This lack of attention to 
particularity is just one of the aspects of scaling up which is problematic and which I will 
suggest can be understood differently using a Bourdieusian lens. 
 
BOURDIEU’S CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT 
 
Bourdieu saw society as made up of fields (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992), interlocking and overlapping spaces. Each social field has a game, and players who 
are invested in it. Each field also has specific capitals at stake. What happens in fields can be 
understood as a ‘game’ in which winning is decided on the basis of who gets the most, in 
both volume and type of, capitals. Capitals are convertible, so for example cultural capital 
can often be exchanged for social and/or economic capital and vice versa. While the game in 
the economic field is maximizing profit, in the education field it is the rationed distribution 
of specific prizes - symbolic, cultural and social capitals rather than capitals which are 
directly economic.  
 
There are similarities and differences between fields; Bourdieu talked of each field being 
relatively autonomous but there being important homologies (commonalities) across them. 
Thus, the ways in which profits are accumulated differentially by different ‘players’ 
(companies, owners, shareholders) is analogous, but not identical, to the ways in which 
elites and elite institutions in the education field accumulate credentials, status, and 
positions of influence.  
 
Bourdieu suggested that the overall field of power is geared to support the re/production of 
national/global economic and social regimes. Every other field has a part to play to make 
this happen. The field of education must produce the people qualified to work at all levels in 
all other fields, as well as to re/produce the kinds of knowledge, skills and dispositions 
already possessed and valued by the social elites and managerial elites in each of the fields. 
The game in the education field is fundamentally ‘sorting and selecting’ people by, for 
example, privileging particular knowledges, ways of speaking and acting, educational 
pathways and particular certification. These come to seem only right and proper, ‘natural’.  
 
However, the education field not only produces knowledge about itself but also about other 
fields. It is thus simultaneously both a field of reproduction and of knowledge production 
and diffusion. Bourdieu discriminates between fields in which practices of reproduction are 
dominant and those devoted to production and diffusion. The purpose of a field of 
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production and diffusion is one devoted to knowledge work, generating and conserving  
‘consecrated‘ capitals and agents who specialise in the work of cultivating and legitimating 
the symbolic goods required in fields of reproduction (Bourdieu, 1993 Ch. 3). In the 
education field, knowledge production and diffusion generally occurs within the higher 
education subfield while reproduction occurs throughout. This understanding is important 
to my argument about scaling up. ‘Scaling up’ is ’knowledge’ generated within a subfield of 
education, often in partnership with government (a subfield of the political field) and 
diffused - and used - throughout the educational and other fields (health, welfare, political, 
housing and so on). 
 
A field is populated by positions – positions are occupied both by institutions (schools, 
colleges, universities, nurseries, community education centres) and by people (or agents, as 
Bourdieu called them). Positions are not evenly distributed in a field and fields are not 
equitable spaces – they are not, as the common saying has it, level playing fields. They 
consist of status and power hierarchies which are derived from both horizontal and vertical 
positional arrangements. It is these status and power hierarchies which are re/produced 
within fields. 
 
Bourdieu argued that the actions taken by players in any field operate according to 
predetermined rules – they are governed by their own logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1990) – 
each field has its play, its own logics and its own specific practices. The game is rationalised 
by field-specific doxa and is played for field-specific social, cultural and symbolic capitals - in 
schooling, qualifications and particular forms of knowledge and networks. Field players 
generally take the doxa as a ‘truth’: in order to be successful they play by the rules. Playing 
the game both requires and produces particular dispositions which become configured as 
‘habitus’ – taken for granted ways of acting, being, thinking and doing.  
 
A final important point about fields is that they are chiasmatic – that is, they are not stable, 
but riven with tensions, debates, oppositions and alternative doxa. In the economic field, for 
example, there is the classic opposition between employers and trade unions, locked in a 
struggle over the distribution of profits. In education, there are also trade unions, but other 
oppositions too, about the capitals at stake and the rules of the game. One of the sites of 
struggle in a field may be that of doxa and representations, about what the rules of the 
game should and could be. It is important for the argument I make here to state that it is 
possible for players to be positioned to carry out the prevailing logic of the field, and to do 
so, but at the same time also take up a doxic position and adopt a partial practice which 
runs counter to that which prevails in the field (Thomson & Hall, 2011). Thus we have for 
example school leaders who must conform to the field enough to stay in post, but who also 
seek to change it and to resist inequitable imposts (Thomson, 2008). In the case discussed 
here, it may be producers of knowledge within the subfield of higher education who are 
able to counter scaling up narratives and practices. 
 
BOURDIEU AND MISRECOGNITION  
 
The term misrecognition is common within the social sciences. It is used for example by 
theorists of race and postcoloniality who argue that racism and racist violence and counter 
actions are misrecognised as criminality within colonial contexts (e.g.Fanon, 1961). The 
term is also used – and debated - by identity theorists and feminists who suggest that the 
process of ‘othering’ (misrecognition) is countered when people are recognised for who 
they are – their differences and differing identities (manifest in diverse ontologies, 
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epistemologies, and axiologies) seen, heard and understood (Fraser, 1997; Fraser & 
Honneth, 2003).  
 
Bourdieu’s use of the term misrecognition differs from these. He does not mean simply 
mistaking one thing for another, although that is involved. Nor does he mean ‘false 
consciousness’, a delusion about material reality, although he does suggest that 
misrecognition involves not ‘seeing’ materialities for what they are and what they do. 
Bourdieu suggests that misrecognition occurs when agents are not entirely unaware of the 
truth of their practices, but act as if they must conceal it from themselves. Agents accept 
doxa and thus ‘misrecognise’ the material reality and effects of the game which, in the case 
of education, is not about reward for meritorious performance but rather, the production 
and reproduction of inequalities  
 
One way to explain Bourdieusian misrecognition is through an example - I will use the store 
loyalty card (1). When we finally get enough points to ‘buy’ something, we feel pleasure; in 
that moment we appear to have something for nothing, even as we understand that we 
have already paid for the gift. On another level, we know that loyalty cards are not only a 
way for stores to encourage us to continue to purchase goods from them, but they are also 
now a way of accumulating information about our individual and demographic buying 
habits. Loyalty cards allow stores to push marketing at us via email, and to tailor the stocks 
in particular shops on the basis of aggregated demographic data. They are a means of 
maximizing profit. A misrecognition occurs when we foreground our feelings of pleasure 
about the loyalty card and play along with the game of points accumulation, ignoring its 
privacy-invading, profit-making function.  
 
In his work on education, Bourdieu notes that education operates via field specific 
misrecognitions; as noted, these re/produce privilege. One of these is the combined idea of 
merit and ability. The attribution of ability and merit – a doxa or taken-for-granted truth in 
the field of education - obscures material reality viz: that children enter the educational field 
with differing capitals; that their families have a crucial role in handing on capitals: and that 
schools perpetuate the hierarchies of capitals through pedagogical practices dependent on 
specific language and disciplinary capitals and processes such as examinations. These 
combine to produce and reproduce dominant ways of knowing, acting and being As 
educational ‘game’ players, children start from different positions (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1977, 1979).  The patterns of differential achievement that are pervasive in the field are 
personalised and individualised and attributed to the deficiencies of social structures such 
as families, schools and neighbourhoods – this is the misrecognition.  
 
Misrecognition of the social determinants of the educational career – and therefore 
of the social trajectory it helps to determine – gives the educational certificate the 
value of a natural right and makes the educational system one of the fundamental 
agencies of the social order (Bourdieu, 1984 p 387) 
 
Both dominant and dominated players in the field accept the misrecognition as a ‘truth’. 
 
The consequences of misrecognition are, Bourdieu says always multiple. Misrecognition 
simultaneously allocates blame and disfavor, perpetuates its doxic basis, and legitimates 
practices which continue to differentially distribute capitals to those who are already 
advantaged in the field. Thus, those children who are not possessed of ‘ability’ or ‘merit’ are 
not simply demonized and seen as lacking but are systematically subject to practices of 
domination – for example, they are streamed and set, offered differentiated curriculum and 
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set tasks and examinations at which they are expected to do poorly, and they do. Their 
failure, and the success of a few, acts to legitimate the belief that their failure was caused by 
lack of ability or application, as well as to re/produce hierarchies which already exist within 
the field.    
 
Bourdieusian notions of misrecognition are arguably less well used within educational 
research than other aspects of his conceptual tool kit – field, capitals and habitus. There are 
however some examples in the literature. For example, English (2012) examined leadership 
standards in the UK and England. He argued that seeing them as a means of system wide 
improvement misrecognised their actual purpose viz. to advance the field position of 
particular national agencies while simultaneously consolidating particular kinds of 
leadership practices, habitus and doxa. Grenfell and James (2004) focused on educational 
research, arguing that attacks on particular kinds of educational research – an ‘avant-garde’ 
in the field – constitute attempts to shore up what counts as legitimate knowledge. 
However seeing this as simply about research methods misrecognised what was at stake – 
ways of knowing about re/production and educational inequalities. They suggest radical 
reflexive research methodologies might counter these dominant and dominating field 
activities. This argument intersects with the case I make here. 
 
I now bring Bourdieu to the notion of scaling up. I present two quite different examples, one 
which illustrates misrecognition, and the other which avoids misrecognition and thus leaves 
a space for further analysis and contestation. In each case I am focused on the knowledge 
(educational capital) that is at issue. 
 
MISRECOGNITION AND SCALING UP 
 
Scaling up advocates often couch their process advice as making ‘radical change’ Radical 
change is understood as the implementation of a whole-scale reform across a unit which 
can be measured. A unit can be a school (scaling up from one classroom), a district (scaling 
up from beacon schools) or a system. Educational scaling up advocates almost always 
include in their formula: leaders who have and spread ‘vision’, schools with some degree of 
autonomy but high accountability via audit and testing, and some degree of systemic 
support and sanction (see Figure 2). 
 
The rules of scaling up 
 
1. Leaders must earn authority  
2. Teachers must have control and autonomy to innovate 
3. Schools need technical support 
4. Individuals and collectives must define and clarify goals/principles 
5. Schools must achieve and sustain quality 
6. Change must have the characteristics of a social movement (urgency, sense of 
possibility) 
7. There must be a few clear goals 
8. There must be agreement about non-negotiables 
9. Policies must allocate resources appropriately 
10. Resistance must be dealt with 
 
Figure 2. My summary of Ron Ferguson, Harvard University, conference address at the 
Achieving Success at Scale, Nashville, June 2012. 
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T53xOAGhmK8&feature=youtu.be. Accessed April 
24, 2013 
 
Contemporary scaling up advocates often now argue that change is not a blueprint, it must 
be sensitive to local context, and must allow for individual variations – personalisation for 
students, developing particular niche offerings for schools. It must be owned by 
participants, must have some form of shared decision-making and a great deal of 
collaboration. Teachers must be allowed to exercise professional judgment, schools must 
have the power to decide what their communities need (Hargreaves & Fullan, 2012; 
Hargreaves & Sahlberg, 2012; Hess, Mehta, & Schwartz, 2012). Figure 2 shows one 
advocate arguing that scaling up must learn urgency and dynamism from social 
movements. It is helpful to note here how scaling up advocates designate responsibility for 
contextual adjustment to implementers not to the model – it is generic and transferable 
across all settings. 
 
Scaling up advocates suggest that successful reform lays in successful process. They 
therefore suggest that failure of reform is a process failure, attributable to those charged 
with carrying out the process or the process itself. Meta-studies of scaling up and its 
problems almost inevitably focus on how questions (e.g. Chapman, 2005; Hubbard, Mehan, 
& Stein, 2006; Pounder, 1998). Educational reform failure is attributed to one or 
combinations of: (1) the reform being badly designed, (2) schools and teachers being 
inadequate for the task, (3) the reform being too simplistic and thus failing to address the 
complexity of problems, (4) aspects of the environment or context being too difficult and (5) 
support for the introduction of the innovation, but not its implementation and/or its 
sustainability (Schneider & McDonald, 2007). Reform advocates and designers are therefore 
charged to remedy the process deficiency: supply what is missing in the environment, gives 
sustained support, include potent incentives, and offer powerful and continuing guidance. 
The implication is that reforms will succeed only if better process techniques can be found 
to address implementation and sustainability problems.  
 
Tyack and Cuban (1995) however take a different view of reform failure, namely that there 
is something about the nature of schooling itself which prevents dramatic change and 
which instead fosters quite gradual evolution. They offer the notion of a ‘grammar’, a kind 
of structural/cultural architecture, which is not amenable to rapid shifts. Despite changes in 
educational governance and policy regimes, they argue, the grammar holds but slow 
changes do occur (Cuban, 1995). Their analysis does suggest something more systemic 
about the ways in which reforms fail. 
 
Bourdieu provides one explanation for this systematic failure. His conceptual toolkit allows 
cases of ‘scaling up’ to be examined in alternative ways. Rather than ask whether these are 
successes or failures, relevant Bourdieusian questions become: 
 
 What capitals are at stake in this reform? 
 What is ‘the game’ being played? 
 What and where is the doxa that is integral to this reform? 
 Who benefits from this reform and how? 
 Does the reform the overall patterns of hierarchy in the field? 




I now take these questions to two examples of scaling up to indicate what a Bourdieusian 
approach might achieve. 
 
EXAMPLE ONE: SCALING UP SUCCESS 
 
The first example is taken from unpublished research conducted by the author and 
colleagues (Thomson, Day, Beales, & Curtis, 2010). The research was commissioned by the 
English National College for School Leadership, as it was then known, and it was intended 
to provide case studies of successful school leadership which could be used for teaching 
purposes in the then mandated qualification necessary for headship (2). The research was 
intended to support the ‘scaling up’ of particular leadership practices.  
 
We were asked to provide twelve case studies; the National College nominated ten of these 
and we chose the final two. The case studies were ‘snapshots’ (Hall, Jones, & Thomson, 
2010); data were generated over three to six days in each location and consisted of 
documents, interviews with the head, Chair of governors, other leaders, teachers and 
students. Case studies were sent to each head for checking before being presented to the 
funder. In the case reported here, the names of the site and the head have been 
anonymised. This case study is one I conducted myself over three days and through two 
extended follow up telephone conversations with the head teacher. 
 
In order to understand the particularity of the case, it is important to flag up some 
characteristics of the schooling field in England. Like all jurisdictions, education in England 
has been subject to global pressures (Lingard & Rawolle, 2013). In order to retain power and 
credibility at home, the UK government has assumed responsibility for raising educational 
standards, as measured on national and international tests. English policy makers have 
opted for a particularly extreme version of marketization, privatization and contractualism, 
the imposition of new audit regimes and new modes of governance (Ball, 2012). The doxa is 
one of ‘raising the bar and closing the gap’ (see Thomson, Hall, & Jones, 2010 for a critique 
of ‘gap talk’) as well as increasing the numbers of students staying in education for ever 
longer periods in order to avoid the collapse in the youth labour market. Accompanying this 
educational ‘massification’ are continued demands for differentiation in order to manage 
access to higher education; this has involved an ongoing struggle over graduating school 
credentials and university access (Thomson, 2010). This English policy settlement, begin in 
the 1980s, has entailed both the imposition of new practices ‘at scale’, and the selective 
‘scaling up’ of particular practices.   
 
A key to this agenda is ‘leadership’ (Gunter, 2011), the focus of our commissioned case 
studies. The field position of leader has become more important as schools have been 
increasingly regulated through governance mechanisms rather than through direct control. 
This case study was undertaken at the point when new forms of schooling – academies, and 
their later incarnation, free schools – were just being introduced and further demands were 
being made on leaders.  
 
Barton Special Needs Federation 
 
Barton school and its head teacher were nominated by the National College for our study 
on the grounds that the head had significantly changed the attainment of students for the 
better. As they were designated ‘special education’ this was to be an example of school 
leadership which closed the gap’ and promoted equity. The aim was to show the doxa of 
good leadership producing improved student outcomes. 
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Barton was originally a special needs facility for secondary boys. When its current head Bill 
was appointed ten years ago, inspectors judged it a failure; there were abysmal student 
outcomes, high staff absenteeism and serious racism and sexism among both staff and 
students. Bill asked the local authority to intervene; the school was temporarily closed, and 
then reopened with some old and some new staff. Over a three year period, the school 
developed routines and elements of the national curriculum and a range of vocational 
options. In the fourth year the school was re-inspected and OfSTED judged it ‘good’. Bill 
told me: 
 
They said we were a very good school, and they described the leadership of the Head 
as outstanding. That was the key thing because then the ball was rolling our way. You 
suddenly got a level of autonomy to do whatever you wanted within obviously the 
guidance … suddenly you were moved into a whole new level of leadership. People 
were phoning asking you advice, invitations from this community, that community. As 
it was for you, personally, so it was for the school. 
 
Bill was then asked by the local authority to offer support to the local Pupil Referral Unit (a 
PRU is an alternative provision for excluded students) which was also deemed in crisis. This 
he did, and he then negotiated to take it over, as well as develop complementary services. 
In Bill’s words: 
 
… it’s about opportunities isn’t it? It’s seeing opportunities and grasping them when 
they’re there. Not, you know, not necessarily waiting, sometimes go out looking for 
them, but sometimes they just present themselves to you and you’ve got to be 
prepared to pounce and take them. The Local Authority said to me, ‘Do you think you 
could support our PRU?’ and I thought ‘Yes I could support that’ but I knew that I didn’t 
want to just support it. I wanted it to become a part of something bigger. But I thought 
the way in was to accept half of it at the moment and then we can go on.  
 
Over time the school expanded to three sites and now offers a comprehensive primary and 
secondary short and long term special education provision, with separate support for school 
refusers and seriously ill children. Barton also provides support for local primary and 
secondary schools in managing ‘difficult’ students, a work placement service and a wide 
range of curriculum. The service operates as a federation, with a single governing body, and 
a local head on each site, with Bill as the Executive Head.  
 
I’m sorry to put this as a market but if you think of it as a market it makes you sharper 
about how you deal with it. It doesn’t make you inhuman, it doesn’t make you a non-
teacher. So I saw that there is definitely a need out there for behaviour kids and I 
wanted to meet that need through providing a solution, hence the Federation’s 
resources.  
 
On the back of this change, Bill has subsequently been invited to become a member of 
prestigious national bodies and is frequently out of the school advising other heads about 
how they can do what he did. Bill is now talking up scaling up what he did and continues to 
do. 
 
A Bourdieusian commentary on Barton and Bill 
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It is not hard to see who benefited from this incident of individual school reform. Barton’s 
students acquired more cultural capital from their school experience which they were able 
to ‘cash in’ in the training field and in employment. They were advantaged by their school’s 
changes when compared to other special students attending less ‘successful’ schools. But 
the change at Barton also brought distinction to both Bill and the school. However, the 
school federation remained, albeit with much higher status, in its special education sub-
field. Bill, on the other hand, became part of an elite body of exemplary school leaders 
working across the entire English schooling field. The difference in distinction – the school 
and students within special education and Bill across the field, are an indication of which 
practices are those to be ‘scaled up’.  
 
Two kinds of capitals, those afforded to students and those used by its head teacher, were 
required to achieve distinction. Students needed to acquire ‘vocational skills’ and ‘value 
added’ test scores, including those that counted most, the GCSE  (all English schools must 
meet target results in this certificate which marks the end of compulsory schooling (Gillborn 
& Youdell, 2000). We can theorise further that extending the kinds of vocational curriculum 
enjoyed by Barton students to all special schools would simply mean that new 
discriminators would need to be developed in order to allocate the very limited numbers of 
jobs and training positions open to special education graduates (Riddell, Edward, Weedon, 
& Ahlgren, 2010). And even if there were less differentiation among special schools, 
Barton’s practices would not change the overall field, because a key differentiating practice 
in the schooling field is via the vocational-academic divide. As long as vocational education 
is subject to the doxa of meritocracy, and legitimated by the histories of head/hands binary 
thinking, any students with vocational credentials will have symbolic and cultural capital 
considered inferior to that of ‘the academic’.  
 
However, Bill was required to use managerial capitals in order to shift the school from 
failing to successful, as his comments on being given a good inspection result showed. 
These capitals were largely directed to ‘capacity building’ of staff and the introduction of a 
curriculum amenable to the production of data which would signify improvement. 
Exercising these managerial capitals kept Bill and the school from losing position, from less 
distinction within the subfield and the schooling field overall. But it was his use of 
entrepreneurial capitals which allowed him to advance his position in both fields: these are 
clearly shown in his comments (above) about visiting other schools, taking advantage of 
opportunities that present themselves, and seeing a market need he could fill. 
 
Bill’s leadership practice was seen by the National College as generic and transferable – able 
to be scaled up across all sub fields/types of schools. The doxa suggested that if all leaders 
followed Bill’s example then systemic gaps in achievement would be reduced, particularly 
for special education students. However this does not follow. At scale there was nothing in 
the logic of Bill’s practices to change the overall hierarchical functioning of the schooling 
field, and a lot in his leadership practice that served to produce and reproduce it.  
 
So what did scaling up Barton and Bill’s leadership accomplish? Bill’s game strategies were 
strongly aligned with the logic of the field - he used external field support to legitimise 
changes and to provide the warrant for his imposition of new internal practices; he 
confirmed to policy expectations about curriculum and pedagogy. But it was his 
anticipation of where the game was going that made him a field exemplar: he took full 
advantage of his autonomy to expand; he mobilised softer forms of leadership – coaching, 
distributing leadership opportunities, and dedicating time and resources to ‘capacity 
building’; at the same time, aspects of his practice were highly masculinist – decisiveness, 
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entrepreneurialism and risk taking for example are highly gendered practices (Blackmore, 
1999; Blackmore & Sachs, 2007). Bill was ‘scaleable’ because he conformed to the doxa and 
because his leadership practice was where the game was headed. ‘Scaling up’ his leadership 
up would help bring into being further school autonomies and increased competition across 
the field. Seeing Bill’s success as having potential to ‘close the gap’ at scale is in fact a 
misrecognition of the way that his practice not only conformed to field logics but also 
actually helped to legitimate and perpetuate the inequitable hierarchies that constitute ‘the 
gap’. 
 
As researchers, we were positionally complicit in the doxic knowledge production elements 
of this overall project (cf English, 2012).  
 
EXAMPLE TWO: A SCALING UP FAILURE 
 
My second example is of a different order. I have argued in this paper that scaling up failure 
is generally attributed to deficiencies in teachers, schools and reform design. This is, I 
suggested, a doxic as well as toxic explanation, a misrecognition of field reproductive 
practices. Change and school effectiveness and improvement policy advocates and 
entrepreneurs take it as a truth. I have suggested that this misrecognition comes in part 
from the sub-field that is dedicated to knowledge production and diffusion. I now examine 
an explanation of scaling up failure which does not misrecognise. I will suggest that it leaves 
open a space for contestation. 
 
This example comes from Australia. The field of school education in Australia is different to 
that of England in that it has more layers – states and districts mediate what national policy 
makers stipulate. While there are moves to governance structures – a national curriculum, 
national testing and league tabling – the field appears more benign than in England.  It is 
divided deeply by ongoing struggles over funding for elite schools versus those serving 
disadvantaged communities. Data suggests that it is a highly stratified national system, 
which continues to reproduce significant inequalities based on class, gender and race 
(OECD, 2013).  
 
The group which fares worst in terms of educational outcome data is Indigenous students. 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has an ambitious plan of action (MCEEDYA, 
2010) which aims to halve the gap in achievement between Indigenous and other Australian 
students by 2018. Effort is be to directed to assisting Indigenous students to play the 
schooling game more effectively. A range of strategies are planned and underway, 
including early childhood intervention, provision of homework centres, additional English 
language programmes and establishment of 900 focus schools with high Indigenous 
enrolments.  
 
The Stronger Smarter Learning Communities (SSLC) programme (2009-2013) fits with, 
although is not part of, the Indigenous Education National Action Plan. The SSLC funded 
hubs of Australian schools to develop Indigenous leadership, positive identity among 
students, high expectations, and improved student learning outcomes. The programme 
was an attempt to scale up the practices and philosophy developed by Chris Sarra at 
Cherbourg State School in south east Queensland (Sarra, 2012a, 2012b). As such it has 
strong similarities to the Indigenous Action Plan’s approach to the 900 focus schools. 
 
A recent academic evaluation of the SSLC (Luke et al., 2013) suggested that the programme 
had had some success – it had successfully changed staffing practices in the participating 
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schools, introduced an Indigenous curriculum element, and promoted increasing awareness 
of the need to do better for Indigenous students. However it had hit a number of problems. 
The evaluators noted: a lack of institutional analysis of how to reform deficit thinking; a 
community view that little had changed; that attendance and achievement had not 
improved; the basic curriculum models of basic skills instruction and vocational education 
remained unchanged; and there was an overall lack of leader and teacher knowledge of and 
engagement with Indigenous communities, knowledges, cultures, languages and histories 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Key finding 17: Teacher self-reported knowledge of Indigenous cultures, histories and 
communities is low. 
Key Finding 18: Teacher self-reported everyday engagement with Indigenous peoples and 
communities outside of the school is low. 
Key Finding 27: The dominant approaches to pedagogy reported by SSLC and non-SSLC 
teachers are emphasis on basic skills instruction and Vocational Education. 
Key Finding 28: Overall reported time allocated to the embedding of Indigenous content, 
topics, and knowledges is low. 
Key Finding 34: SSLC Hub Schools ‘ choices of curriculum programs, approaches and in-
service programs are eclectic, with no discernable patterns of state, regional or school-type 
consistency. 
Figure 2: Examples of SSLC findings which draw attention to social and cultural capitals. 
 
For my argument about misrecognition, it is important to note the ways in which this SSLC 
evaluation differs from those offered by process advocates from the school effectiveness 
and improvement/school reform and change area. Failure in the SSLC was not seen simply 
as a problem of process, and the sole responsibility of teachers, schools and programme 
design. The report expresses concerns which directly relate to the logic of the education 
field – the privileging of particular forms of knowledges and languages, the sorting and 
selecting effected through vocational and basic skills curricula, the doxa of ability and merit 
which underpins deficit thinking. While not expressed directly in Bourdieusian terms, the 
evaluation follows a Bourdieusian line of argument. It offers an account of the difficulties of 
scaling up a change which runs somewhat counter to the doxa, the logic of practice and the 
capitals at stake in the field.   
 
There is also in the SSLC report a suggestion that schools need to relate differently to 
Indigenous communities. This might mean much more than better parent-teacher 
relationships; it might also cover engagement with the ongoing struggles of Indigenous 
peoples for land, rights, and equitable services. One of the causes of failure to ‘scale up’ this 
particular programme perhaps resides in the doxic difficulties of ‘getting political’. The late 
Jean Anyon (2005) argued that recent shifts in the education field have always been as a 
result of the political activities of larger social movements acting in coordinated way across 
fields. She contended that we cannot understand struggles around education for African 
Americans without understanding the long history of slavery and the civil rights movement. 
Similarly, the education of girls is inextricably connected with the history of suffrage and 
various waves of the women’s movements. Anyon’s argument suggests that in order for 
change for Indigenous students to be more successful – to progress beyond distinction for a 
minatory of individuals and institutions – schools must make stronger alliances across fields 




The SSLC report is, I suggest, an example of how it is possible for the higher education 
subfield to discuss reform – and reform failure – without misrecognition. The report’s 
authors show the capitals at stake in the field – Indigenous knowledges – and key 
reproductive practices such as sorting and selecting via vocational education and life skills 
(these also featured in Barton’s success) and the unequal distribution of resources – 
insufficient time available for teachers to acquire new social and cultural capitals. Drawing 
attention to these capitals and practices makes them available for contestation.  
 
Showing that there are no systematic patterns of curriculum which consolidate Indigenous 
capitals leaves the way open for a reading which says that this lack of systemacity is integral 
to the production and reproduction of dominant interests. It also allows a reading which 
recognizes, not misrecognises, that while acting counter to white interests might be 
acceptable in one or even a few schools, and even potentially bring distinction to those that 
succeeded in this venture, at a more systemic level this is difficult, since it challenges 
dominant field interests by changing the game and the capitals at stake.   
 
The Bourdieusian re-reading begins with the notion that fields are unstable, and that action 
across fields, particularly in times of crisis, can produce change in the overall balance of 
power and interests. As Wacquant (2004, p. 11) explains, Bourdieu saw change in 
democratic societies as an  
 
historical process of negation of social negation, a never-ending effort to make 
social relations less arbitrary, institutions less unjust, distributions of resources and 
options less imbalanced, recognition less scarce. 
 
The history of education does suggest that even as the mass level of education has risen, 
social and economic hierarchies remain, but there have been changes in practices and 
positions. Arguably, in both England and Australia, field borders have become more porous 
and the fields themselves less autonomous (Thomson, 2005). There also have been changes 
which have resulted at least in part form internal field contests where the volume and types 
of capitals which are dominant have shifted. For example, gender has ceased to have such a 
potent negative effect on middle class girls’ education while it remains a potent negative 
when they try to cash in their symbolic educational capital in the labour market.  
 
Bourdieu notes that contestation over capitals often occurs in the cultural rather than the 
economic sphere. Thus, because fields are chiasmatic, that is, it is riven with temporally-
spatially specific oppositional ideas and practices, ideas and practices which challenge field 
prevalent doxa and logics co-exist. These act as reservoirs of potential new practices able to 
be scaled up should the situation change in other more dominant fields or across fields. The 
analysis in this report may indeed act as just such a reservoir of potential new practice. 
 
 A Bourdieusian re-reading of the SSLC evaluation suggests that at least some of the failure 
to scale up the programme was located in the challenge it offered to the ongoing 
reproduction of white privilege and European knowledges. This is not stated as such in the 
report. Rather, the report analyses, not theorises. The authors present a sophisticated set of 
pointers and refuse the doxa of misrecognition via the conventional scaling up attribution of 
process blame. This, I suggest, provides a space for agents in the field to not only provide 
their own reflexive reading of the text, but also to use this to inform countering strategies 
focused on field practices such as the privileging of particular capitals, the perpetuation of 
the vocational-academic divide across the entire schooling field, and the schism between 
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Indigenous communities and organisations and their schools. Of course, this text may also 
be subject to a reading which misrecognises. 
 
In conclusion, I consider further the idea of misrecognition and its use within the knowledge 
production and dissemination subfield. 
 
TALKING ABOUT MISRECOGNITION  
 
Using a Bourdieusian lens, I have argued that the notion of scaling up as it is most 
commonly promulgated – including by academics in the higher education subfield  - is a 
misrecognition of the logic of practices in the education field. The focus on process allows 
failure to be attributed to particular individuals and institutions rather than being seen as a 
legitimation and furthering of field differentiating practices. I have also suggested that 
those involved in the knowledge and production subfield are positioned to re/produce the 
doxa of scaling up and can be complicit in misrecognition  - or they can act otherwise. This 
suggestion is in accord with the ‘radical research’ suggested by Grenfell and James, referred 
to earlier in the paper, and with Bourdieu’s arguments about the conduct of sociology and 
sociologists. 
 
In a Bourdieusian spirit, I want to briefly examine some critiques of the notion of 
misrecognition. The concept is not universally admired. Ranciere  (2004) argues for example 
that misrecognition is simply and unhelpfully circuitous – the system is reproduced because 
it is misrecognised and naturalized via doxa, and in reproducing itself, the system 
re/produces the effect of misrecognition. This leaves, Ranciere argues, the ‘philosopher’ as 
the only person able to see the system for what it is, and the only person able to denounce it 
for its cruelty. There is something of this in the argument I have made here, although I have 
been careful to suggest that it is not only the higher education subfield which is able to 
generate counter understandings.  
 
Gorski (2013) argues that the Bourdieusian proposition - that naturalization and 
misrecognition are fundamental to the reproduction of cultural capital – is not amenable to 
empirical investigation but operates best at an abstract level. What is required for empirical 
specificities, he suggests, is something rather more traditionally Marxist, an investigation of 
symbolic exchanges, process and values. While I have not done this, it does seem that the 
examples I have re-read for this paper did generate some of this kind of data.  
 
 Burawoy (2012) offers another view which picks up on both of these critiques. Burawoy 
compares Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. He 
suggests that Gramsci overlooked ‘the mystification that characterizes advanced 
capitalism’. However, Bourdieu saw misrecognition as  
 
deep and universal – the result of the incorporated and embodied habitus, a process 
of internalization that was unconscious rather than a spontaneous effect of 
specifically capitalist relations (p 189) 
 
Burawoy contends that this understanding positioned Bourdieu as overly pessimistic about 
change, compared to Gramsci’s over optimism about the possibilities of  ‘seeing’ material 
relations of domination. Burawoy argues that while Bourdieu’s notion of change rests on 
the discrepancy between position and dispositions, this does not adequately explain a 
number of recent events including the fall of state socialism (3). This however was not the 
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task undertaken here, which was to consider change that is less seismic and integral to the 
stubborn static correlation between privilege and education. 
 
While, Bourdieu’s conception of misrecognition may well have limits and pitfalls, I suggest 
that, as part of a conceptual toolkit, it does have something to offer. While it may not show 
a way to transform the field, it can certainly, for those of us engaged in knowledge 
production and dissemination, open up critical readings of current practices, including our 
own. Because of the way in which dominant agents in the education field use knowledge as 
part of the game, and are invested in doxa which hide the material realities of domination, it 
is surely helpful to adopt a reflexive position which asks how our work might constitute a 
misrecognition, might perpetuate doxa, or might be easily taken up to further these ends. 
This seems essential to the work of reflexive academic practice, as well as offering 
knowledge resources that might support those engaged in more active contestation in the 
field.   
 
Notes 
(1) This example courtesy of David James. 
(2) These materials have, as far as we know, been published and are in use, but we have 
never been sent a copy.  
(3) Burawoy argues that the fall of the Soviet Union was caused by a crisis in the ruling 
elites to manage their ideologies and material realities and this brought the possibility 
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